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Since its enactment in 1978, chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code has been the prototype for what a corporate
reorganization procedure should look like. And given the broad
potential reach of the American Bankruptcy Code—applicable both
to assets “wherever located,” 1 and debtors owning only a modest
amount of assets in the United States— 2 chapter 11 also seems like
it should be a leading tool for restructuring global businesses as
well. 3
But we use this short paper to examine why chapter 15 has
instead become the preferred tool of global reorganization. 4 While
chapter 15 represents a vital part of this new regime, it represents a
smaller portion of the overall restructuring architecture as compared
with a “pure” chapter 11 restructuring of global businesses.
Whether that is good or bad largely depends on where one stands. 5
As we discuss in closing, it is also possible that chapter 11’s
time will come, but that largely depends on deep changes in debt
markets, which may or may not come to pass. For the present,
chapter 15 is clearly dominant in America’s contribution to global
restructuring.
I. Introduction
In the United States, chapter 11 has dominated the corporate
restructuring landscape largely because it has never required that the
debtor-firm show its own insolvency to commence proceedings. 6
11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
Id. § 109. Indeed, caselaw makes clear that any amount of property in the United
States will satisfy the requirements of the section. As one New York bankruptcy court
summarized, “Section 109(a) says nothing about the amount of such property nor does it
direct that there be any inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the debtor’s acquisition
of the property.” In re Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd., 520 B.R. 399, 413 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quotation omitted).
3 See generally Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Bankruptcy
Tourists, 70 BUS. LAW. 719 (2015) (analyzing foreign corporate debtors’ use of the United
States Bankruptcy Code).
4 For an overview of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was actually enacted
in 2005, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default:
Chapter 15, the ALI Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1,
18–21 (2002).
5 American restructuring professionals, for example, are apt to have a different take
on this as compared with management of debtor-companies. Bondholders are apt to have
yet another view.
6 In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 121 (3d Cir. 2004).
1
2
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This stands in contrast to every other corporate reorganization
system. 7
As such, in the American system, there has largely been a binary
choice between bankruptcy—chapter 11 or the rare corporate
chapter 7 case— 8 and non-bankruptcy workouts. 9 The latter are
largely a matter of contract, although they can be structured with
strong doses of coercion. 10 And should the latter fail, chapter 11
stands ready to backstop the effort, again because there is little to
keep a debtor-firm from using the Bankruptcy Code whenever it
might be useful.
Other developed jurisdictions have embraced “pre-insolvency”
procedures, which lie somewhere between formal bankruptcy and
contractual workouts. 11 The prototype here is the English Scheme
of Arrangement, which resides within corporate law, rather than

7 For example, under the Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act
(“CCAA”)—often said to be the closest analog to American chapter 11—the basic term
“debtor company” is defined to mean a firm that:
(a) is bankrupt or insolvent,
(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the Winding-up and
Restructuring Act, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have
been taken under either of those Acts,
(c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has
been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or
(d) is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring
Act because the company is insolvent; (compagnie débitrice)
Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-36, § 2(1) (Can.). See
generally VIRGINIA TORRIE, REINVENTING BANKRUPTCY LAW: A HISTORY OF THE
COMPANIES’ CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT (2020).
8 Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1372 (2007) (“Most corporations that invoke the
bankruptcy system file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization.”).
9 State governments have recently enacted a series of bankruptcy-like receivership
and assignment procedures, the Constitutional viability of which is unclear. STEPHEN J.
LUBBEN, THE LAW OF FAILURE: A TOUR THROUGH THE WILDS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS
INSOLVENCY LAW, ch. 3 (2018).
10 William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 1597, 1608–11 (2018).
11 For ease, we use “bankruptcy” in the American sense (rather than the European
sense, where bankruptcy refers only to what Americans would call personal bankruptcy,
while “insolvency” refers to what Americans call business bankruptcy). Our focus
throughout is on the financially distressed firm, and not on individuals.
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insolvency law. 12 This is a straightforward procedure, whereby a
majority of creditors in a single class can agree to bind all creditors
to a deal. 13
Because a scheme is done under corporate law, rather than
bankruptcy or insolvency law, the normal European rules that
prohibit filing away from a firm’s “center of main interests” are
inapplicable, 14 and thus schemes are open to those businesses with
but a slight connection to England or Wales. 15 Debt issued under
English law, or a small office in London will usually do the trick. 16
Schemes, like chapter 11, are thus available to most global
businesses. Standing alone, their reach is more modest, applicable
to foreign incorporated debtors, yet courts will hesitate to approve
the schemes unless assured that the result will be accepted abroad. 17
Chapter 15 provides for the commencement of a bankruptcy
case in the United States that is ancillary or complementary to an
insolvency proceeding pending in some other country. 18 The
chapter 15 case will support the foreign case and will not be a “full”
bankruptcy case like a chapter 7 liquidation or a chapter 11
reorganization. 19 Rather chapter 15 allows for the imposition of an
automatic stay within the United States, 20 and the potential
12 Companies Act 2006, c.46, pt. 26 (Eng.) [hereinafter Companies Act]. See
generally Adam Gallagher & Victoria Cromwell, English Schemes of Arrangement: A
Tool for European Restructuring, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38 (2012).
13 A scheme requires approval by at least 75% in value of each class of the members
or creditors who vote on the scheme, being also at least a majority in number of each class.
Companies Act, supra note 12, § 899(1).
14 Horst Eidenmüller, What Is an Insolvency Proceeding?, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 53,
57–58 (2018).
15 Susan Block-Lieb, Reaching to Restructure Across Borders (Without OverReaching), Even After Brexit, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 9 (2018). If schemes of arrangement
were governed by the EU Insolvency Regulation, companies not incorporated in the United
Kingdom would need to shift their COMI to the United Kingdom to use a scheme. Id. at
4–5.
16 See generally Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC (Ch) 1104 (Eng.) (sanctioning
an English Scheme of Arrangement to restructure a company with a German COMI).
17 See id. See generally Re Stronghold Insurance Company Ltd [2018] EWHC (Ch)
2909 (Eng.).
18 Andrew B. Dawson, Modularity in Cross-Border Insolvency, 93 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 677, 678 (2018).
19 William J. Moon, Tax Havens as Producers of Corporate Law, 116 MICH. L. REV.
1081, 1094–95 (2018).
20 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1).
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enforcement of a foreign bankruptcy plan by the U.S. bankruptcy
court. 21
And thus chapter 15 often provides the missing ingredient that
allows a scheme to successfully reorganize a non-U.K. corporation.
A global business thus has a choice of reorganization tools. At
a basic level, this choice involves chapter 11 as contrasted with the
U.K. scheme-chapter 15 combination package. But in recent years,
leading jurisdictions have enacted enhanced “pre-insolvency”
procedures that graft more the features of a full chapter 11 process
onto the basic scheme architecture. Provisions that allow for
termination or assignment of ongoing contracts or “cramdown” of a
plan on a dissenting class are among those.
We thus use this paper to consider the wide variety of
restructuring options available to a global business, with the specific
focus on how traditional chapter 11 stacks up against the newer
options. In Part 1 of the paper, we look at the basic chapter 11English scheme dynamic. As we have noted in prior work, chapter
11 both benefits and suffers from being the “gold standard” in
corporate reorganization. 22 It provides a flexible process that
supports such disparate insolvency cases as the (relatively) orderly
liquidation of Lehman Brothers, the sale-reorganization of General
Motors and Chrysler, and the more traditional reorganizations of
most of the nation’s larger airlines. But with regard to more
mundane businesses, chapter 11 is complex, somewhat formalistic,
and seemingly expensive.
In Part 2 we turn to three newer systems that have been recently
adopted: namely, the pre-insolvency procedures of the Netherlands,
Singapore, and England’s own proposal for a new Part 26A
insolvency system. The Dutch and British systems were only
adopted in 2020, whereas Singapore enacted its statute in 2017.23 In
general terms, these new systems push the pre-insolvency or scheme
In re Lupatech S.A., 611 B.R. 496, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Essential Corporate Bankruptcy Law,
16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 39, 39–41 (2015).
23 The amendments to Singapore’s Companies Act came into force on May 23, 2017.
See Companies (Amendment) Act of 2017, Bill No. 25/2014 (Sing.) [hereinafter
Companies (Amendment) Act of 2017]. As described further below, the British system
was adopted in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 crisis, and the Dutch system is effective
the 1st of January 2021. See generally Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020,
c.12 (Eng.) [hereinafter Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act]; Art. 370.1 FW (Neth.)
[hereinafter FAILLISSEMENTSWET].
21
22
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process a bit closer to chapter 11, without going so far as to
approach some of the drawbacks of the more established U.S.
reorganization chapter. Combined with an American chapter 15
filing, any of these new systems would offer yet another option for
reorganizing a global business. And given the uncertainty that
attends the U.K. scheme process in light of Brexit, the Singapore
and Dutch statutes have the potential to usurp the role current played
by schemes. And presumably these techniques could and would
also be paired with a U.S. chapter 15 filing to provide further global
reach.
In Part 3 of the paper we address the central reason why the
“chapter 15 plus” approach to reorganization will tend to prevail
over chapter 11, at least in the near term. Among other things, we
note that most of the foreign procedures that will pair with chapter
15 entail substantially less “process” than chapter 11 itself, which is
quite abundant in process. Whether the “chapter 15 plus” package
has too little process, or simply less process, is unclear.
While a reduction in the formality of the process might be
unattractive from the creditor perspective, from the debtor
perspective there are obvious advantages. Namely, the less
procedural, and court-focused “pre-insolvency” procedures greatly
reduce both the time and transparency associated with
restructuring. 24 And it is the debtor, after all, who will largely drive
the choice of procedures, inasmuch as all of the procedures we study
are largely “voluntary.” 25 Moreover, we observe that debtors are
not apt to pay for such moves ex ante—inasmuch as the pricing
mechanism is apt to have difficulty transmitting the costs of
reorganization back to the point of issuance in any meaningful
way. 26
The 2005 adoption of chapter 15 of the Code allows for global
businesses to pick from among a broad array of business
reorganization procedures, and then have that procedure enforced
within the United States. We ultimately conclude that, at least at
24 See Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed Doors: The Influence
of Creditors in Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2011).
25 Most of the pre-insolvency procedures are voluntary, and while an involuntary
chapter 11 case is theoretically possible, all indications are that such are quite rare. Susan
Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the Number Is Not
Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 804–05 (1991).
26 The result might be different if the costs were truly substantial, but in any of the
developed economies we address herein, that is not the case.
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present, for many global businesses the combination of a preinsolvency procedure with a chapter 15 filing represents a more
attractive offer than a chapter 11 case standing alone.
II. Chapter 11 and English Schemes
In this part of the paper, we examine the traditional methods of
restructuring a global business. One common method is to use
chapter 11 to cover the entire corporate group. Another method,
historically favored by many European debtors, is to reorganize the
group’s outstanding indebtedness under an English scheme of
arrangement. The efficacy of a scheme can be enhanced by
obtaining recognition of the scheme under chapter 15 in the United
States, thus extending the restructuring into the other leading
financial center (New York). We examine each in turn.
A. Chapter 11 for the Global Debtor
Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “only a
person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property
in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this
title.” 27 Unpacking this a bit, we see that either a person or a
municipality can be a debtor under the Code. A person must meet
one additional requirement, in that they have to either reside in the
United States or have their domicile, do business, or own property
in the United States. Under the Code, “persons” include
corporations. 28
Note what section 109 does not say: there is no requirement that
the entity be formed under American law. Indeed, each year dozens
of foreign corporations and other foreign entities file bankruptcy
petitions in the United States. 29
There is also no requirement that the entity be insolvent. 30 This
stands in stark contrast to the laws in most other jurisdictions, where
bankruptcy and insolvency are synonymous. 31

27
28
29
30

2013).

11 U.S.C. § 109(a).
Id. § 101(41).
Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 3.
In re Marshall, 403 B.R. 668, 686 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 721 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.

31 For example, in England, Scotland, and Wales, a court can only open
Administration proceedings against a firm if the court “is satisfied that [the] company is
or is likely to become unable to pay its debts. Insolvency Act 1986, c.45, § 8(1) (Eng.).
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A non-U.S. entity, contemplating bankruptcy in the United
States, must have a place of business or property in the United
States—simply doing business in the United States is not enough.32
But it is easy to satisfy this rule—any property in the United States
will do: no matter the value or type. 33 And the property could take
many forms: contracts with New York choice of law clauses have
been held sufficient. 34 Same for retainers held by the debtor’s
bankruptcy attorneys—which means this requirement could almost
be self-fulfilling: a foreign company hires an American law firm,
gives it a retainer, and presto! —its contingent rights in that retainer
constitute property in the United States. 35
Thus, many global businesses will be able to file to reorganize
under chapter 11. Filing is not the same as enforcing the terms of
the resulting restructuring, however. 36 As a general rule, most
jurisdictions will not recognize the results of an American
bankruptcy case filed by a non-American corporate entity. 37 For
example, the reorganization of a German corporation under chapter
11 would likely get little respect in a German court.
Some jurisdictions also will not recognize an American
bankruptcy proceeding that purports to restructure debt issued under
non-American law. England provides the most notable example of
this, following the “Gibbs rule,” which holds that English law debt
can only be revamped in an English proceeding, save when a
creditor voluntarily submits to a foreign proceeding. 38
As a result, the ability to reorganize a global business, whether

In re Head, 223 B.R. 648, 651 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998).
Suntech Power Holdings, 520 B.R. at 413.
34 In re Berau Capital Res. Pte Ltd., 540 B.R. 80, 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
35 In re B.C.I. Finances Pty Ltd., 583 B.R. 288, 293 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).
36 David P. Stromes, The Extraterritorial Reach of the Bankruptcy Code’s Automatic
Stay: Theory vs. Practice, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 284–85 (2007).
37 See Lucas Jullian, Grasping at Straws: Exploring PDVSA’s Access to Debtor
Relief Under Restructuring Regimes, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 863, 901 (2018).
38 The rule comes from Antony Gibbs & Sons v. La Societe Industrielle et
Commerciale des Metaux (1890) 25 QBD 399 at 406 (Eng.). For a recent application, see
Bakhshiyeva v. Sberbank of Russia [2018] EWHC (Ch) 59, [44]–[53] (Eng.). Interestingly,
the United States followed a kind of “internal Gibbs rule” during the nineteenth century–
and perhaps even later. See e.g., Hornick, More & Porterfield v. Farmers’ & Merchants’
Bank, 227 N.W. 375, 379 (S.D. 1929) (holding that state insolvency laws apply only to
contracts created under the same state’s law); see also Stephen J. Lubben, A New
Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 319, 357–58 (2013).
32
33
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an individual firm or a group, turns on the ability to apply chapter
11 extraterritorially. While some argue otherwise, 39 most
commentators and courts have taken the Code’s statement that a
bankruptcy estate is comprised of the debtor’s property “wherever
located and by whomever held,” to be a clear indication that
Congress intended a worldwide reach. 40
The bankruptcy court can itself enforce a chapter 11 plan against
any party over which it has jurisdiction. 41 Given the United States’
status as a financial center—New York City’s status as such, in
particular—many institutional investors will be within the court’s
reach.
Chapter 11 thus operates to reorganize a global business on a
“pretty good” basis: creditors without ties to the United States will
be immune from the process, and will only be bound if they
voluntarily participate. 42 But larger bondholders and most banks
will be bound by the chapter 11 plan.
The drawbacks of chapter 11 are primarily the same as for a
domestic, American debtor. In particular, chapter 11 is a fairly
formal process, that largely takes place in open court. 43 The degree
of transparency is far beyond what even publicly traded firms are
accustomed to, and perhaps puts already distressed debtors at a
disadvantage relative to their non-bankruptcy competitors. In
addition, while the cost of American chapter 11 is often overstated
because of this transparency (which makes the cost very apparent),
the formality of the process does entail some cost. 44
Closely related to cost and formality is the question of duration:

39 Shlomo Maza, Yes, No, or Maybe: The Presumption Against Extra-Territoriality
in the Bankruptcy Context, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 601, 621–22 (2015).
40 Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A PostUniversalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 726 (1999) (“Most national bankruptcy
systems, including those of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, claim
jurisdiction over the assets of a filing debtor wherever located, including assets located in
other nations.”).
41 Lauren L. Peacock, A Tale of Two Courts: The Novel Cross-Border Bankruptcy
Trial, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 543, 558 (2015).
42 Kurt A. Mayr, Enforcing Prepackaged Restructurings of Foreign Debtors Under
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 469, 471 (2006).
43 See Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609,
1624–29 (2009).
44 See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Through Jevic’s Mirror: Orders, Fees, and
Settlements, 72 BUS. L. 917, 936 (2017).
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because chapter 11 is a court-focused reorganization mechanism,
questions of due process prevent too much compression of the
process. Even in Lehman Brothers—undoubtedly involving the
most extreme facts—the bankruptcy court provided one week of
notice before the sale to Barclay’s could proceed. 45 Most normal
chapter 11 cases will take substantially longer than that—traditional
reorganizations often about two years. 46
B. English Schemes of Arrangement (and Chapter 15)
Traditionally, the global debtor’s leading alternative
restructuring option to an American chapter 11 case has been an
English scheme of arrangement. A scheme of arrangement is a
procedure under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 under which a
company may enter into a compromise or arrangement with its
members or creditors (or any class of them). 47 There is no need for
a company to be insolvent to use a scheme. 48
Under an English scheme, creditors must be divided into
classes, depending on their rights and interests. 49 While the caselaw
on scheme classification is not nearly as developed as that in chapter
11, the general rule seems to be that courts draw a distinction
between differing rights (which could split a class) and differing
interests (which should not). 50 Unlike chapter 11, there is no
“cramdown” power in a scheme, and is not possible to proceed if
even one class votes against the overall reorganization. As a result,
the debtor-firm has some incentive to group creditors into as few
classes as possible. Moreover, not all creditors will necessarily be
affected by a scheme, and unaffected creditors will not be asked to

45 Alla Raykin, Section 363 Sales: Mooting Due Process?, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV.
J. 91, 95 (2012).
46 Foteini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Pre-Planned Cases, and Refiling Rates: An
Empirical Analysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571, 586
(2015).
47 Schemes have their roots in an 1870 statute, and before the enactment of federal
reorganization procedures during the 1930s, some American commentators advocated
enactment of a scheme statute in the United States. See, e.g., James N. Rosenberg, New
Scheme of Reorganization, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 529–30 (1917).
48 Eidenmüller, supra note 14, at 56.
49 See generally Practice Statement (Companies: Schemes of Arrangement) [2002]
WLR 1345, [1] (Eng.).
50 See Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) Ltd [2018] EWHC (Ch) 1980, [5]
(Eng).
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vote on the scheme.
Lockup agreements are frequently used in connection with
schemes, and courts have held that creditors who sign such
agreements do not need to be separately classified. 51 Similarly, it is
common to pay consent fees to creditors who agree to be “locked
up” by a specific deadline, and payment of such fees also does not
automatically result in separate classification of creditors. 52 As
noted before, the overall goal is to get at least 50% in number
constituting 75% in value of each relevant class of creditors in favor
of the scheme of arrangement, and only then can it proceed to court
approval (or “sanction”). 53
Foreign corporations can use the process if there is a “sufficient
connection” between the foreign company and England for the
English courts to have jurisdiction to sanction the scheme. 54 Debt
instruments governed by English law provide one basis for finding
such a connection, but other factors, including a presence in the
United Kingdom, could form the basis for a scheme. 55 As discussed
further below, often the kind of presence that will support a scheme
will also provide the basis for finding that the debtor has an
“establishment” in the United Kingdom for purposes of 1502(2) of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
For example, in Re Stripes U.S. Holdings Inc., 56 a Delaware
corporation, whose primary asset was the equity of another U.S.
corporation, filed a scheme. Its credit facility that was the subject
of the scheme was governed by English law and accordingly the
“sufficient connection” test was satisfied. 57 Likewise, in Primacom
Holding GmbH v. Credit Agricole, 58 a German firm, with no
English creditors, was able to obtain court approval for a scheme
because the intercreditor agreement and all finance documents were
51

(Eng.).

Primacom Holding GmbH v. Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC (Ch) 3746, [98]

Re Seat Pagine Gialle SPA [2012] EWHC (Ch) 3686, [16], [18]–[21] (Eng.).
See Companies Act, supra note 12, § 899(1).
54 Id. § 895(2) (defining “company” as any company liable to wound up under the
Insolvency Act of 1986, which includes “unregistered” companies such as foreign
corporations).
55 Re Noble Group Ltd. [2018] EWHC (Ch) 3092, [100]–[101], [109]–[111] (Eng.).
56 Id.
57 See id. (discussing how, with sufficient creditor support, the governing law of a
debt instrument could be changed to facilitate a scheme).
58 See Primacom Holding, EWHC (Ch) 3746, [98].
52
53
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governed by the law of England & Wales and the parties had
submitted to the English courts’ jurisdiction. 59
Given London’s status—at least for the present—as an
important financial center, the scheme itself is apt to be binding on
the many institutional creditors that have a substantial presence in
the City. 60 But to expand the effects of a scheme, particularly with
regard to debtors that have either U.S. operations or significant U.S.
based creditors, it has become common to seek “recognition” of the
scheme under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. 61
Chapter 15 provides for the commencement of a bankruptcy
case in the United States that is ancillary or complementary to an
insolvency proceeding pending in some other country. 62 The
chapter 15 case will support the foreign case and will not be a “full”
bankruptcy case like a chapter 7 liquidation or a chapter 11
reorganization. 63 The chapter is based on the Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency prepared by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”). 64
Id.
Adam Gallagher & Victoria Cromwell, English Schemes of Arrangement: A Tool
for European Restructuring, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38, 91 (2012) (“A creditor based in
England and Wales that took action in contravention of the terms of the scheme would find
that not only was its claim rejected by the court, but it might also be liable for contempt of
court in breaching the scheme.”).
61 For examples of schemes recently recognized under chapter 15 in the United
States, see In re Lecta Paper U.K. Ltd., No. 1:19-BK-13990 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,
2020) (order recognizing foreign proceeding, U.K. scheme of arrangement, and granting
relief); In re Syncreon Automotive U.K. Ltd., No. 1:19-BK-11702 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept.
11, 2019); In re NN2 Newco Ltd., No. 7:19-BK-23277 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2019)
(order recognizing foreign proceeding, U.K. scheme of arrangement, and granting relief);
In re PLC New Look Secured Issuer, No. 1:19-BK-11005 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2019)
(order granting foreign proceeding and granting related relief); In re Bibby Offshore Servs.
PLC, No. 1:17-BK-13588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018) (order granting petition for
recognition of foreign main proceeding and motion for related relief); In re B.V. Metinvest,
No. 1:17-BK-10130 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 8, 2017); In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc., 570 B.R.
687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017); In re PLC EnQuest, No. 1:16-BK-12983 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 17, 2016); In re Codere Finance (U.K.) Ltd., No. 1:15-BK-13017 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 11, 2015).
62 Young Hye ‘Martina’ Chun, Cross-Border Insolvencies: To “Universalize” or to
Arbitrate?, 17 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 65, 70 (2017).
63 See Lia Metreveli, Toward Standardized Enforcement of Cross-Border Insolvency
Decisions: Encouraging the United States to Adopt UNCITRAL’s Recent Amendment to
Its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 315, 325
(2017).
64 Id. at 326, 335–36. Section 1501(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the purpose
59
60
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After notice and hearing, section 1517 provides that the
bankruptcy court must enter an order recognizing the foreign
proceeding if the proceeding is a foreign main proceeding or a
foreign non-main proceeding within the meaning of section 1502. 65
A foreign main proceeding is one pending in the country where the
debtor has the center of its main interests (or “COMI”), while a
foreign non-main proceeding is one pending in a foreign country
where the debtor has an “establishment.” 66 Cases with but tenuous
links to England would presumably proceed under the latter
approach.
The scheme plus chapter 15 package has the advantage—when
compared to chapter 11—of being far less transparent. For
example, while professionals working in a chapter 11 case are
subject to extensive disclosure requirements, and their
compensation must be approved by the bankruptcy court, there are
no such requirements in either chapter 15 or schemes. Likewise, in
a scheme the debtor only need provide creditors with information
about the proposed reorganization, and even that information can be
provided in password protected internet sites. 67 In chapter 11, on
the other hand, the disclosure obligations are substantial, and all
must be made publicly available on the court’s docket. 68
On the other hand, schemes themselves provide none of the
tools that chapter 11 provides to reject unwanted contracts, 69
recover pre-insolvency payments, 70 or sell assets “free and clear”
and the following five objectives of chapter 15: (i) to encourage cooperation between
courts of the United States (including the United States trustee and appointed fiduciaries)
and foreign courts in cross-border insolvency cases; (ii) to provide greater legal certainty
for trade and investment; (iii) to promote the fair and efficient administration of crossborder insolvencies in a way that protects the interests of all creditors, the debtor and other
interested entities; (iv) to protect and maximize the value of the debtor’s assets; and (v) to
facilitate the rescue of financially troubled businesses with the goal of protecting
investments and preserving employment. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a).
65 See 11 U.S.C. § 1517.
66 See John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International
Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 964–65 (2005) (discussing how Section 1502 defines
“establishment” as “any place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory
economic activity”).
67 See Companies Act, supra note 12, § 897.
68 Hon. Alan S. Trust, Bankruptcy as a Fish Bowl of Disclosure, AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 48, 48 (2010).
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 365.
70 See id. § 547.
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of claims. 71 These limitations are addressed in the newer means of
reorganizing a global business that we examine in the next part of
this paper.
III. New Offerings Abroad
We use this part of the paper to note three potential competitors
to the existing methods of reorganizing a transnational firm. Two
were enacted just as this paper went to print, but one has been law
for almost three years now. As with traditional schemes, all of the
following procedures could presumably be paired with a U.S.
chapter 15 filing to give broader reach to the restructuring. We
sketch each in turn.
A. Dutch Scheme
The Netherland’s current bankruptcy proceedings have many
different qualities in comparison to Anglo-American law. In short,
under the current Netherlands bankruptcy act, known as the Dutch
Bankruptcy Act, there are three official proceedings: (1) a
bankruptcy process that applies to companies, other legal entities,
and natural persons; (2) preliminary and definitive ‘suspension of
payments’; and (3) debt reorganization of natural persons. 72
The Dutch government is to add two new procedures aimed at
restructuring a firm to the current Dutch Bankruptcy Act. The two
draft bills are called: (1) The Continuity of Enterprises Act I, and
(2) The Act on the Confirmation of a Private Plan (“ACPP”). 73 The
Enterprise Act I aims to facilitate and provide a statutory basis for
U.K.-style pre-packs (which Americans would instead call 363
sales) and the Act of a Private Plan—often referred to by its Dutch
initials WHOA— 74 introduces a scheme-like instrument in the
See id. § 363(f).
Insolvency Proceedings in the Netherlands, TEN: EURO. NETWORK OF L. FIRMS,
https://www.ten-law.net/knowledge/insolvency-proceedings-in-the-netherlands/
[https://perma.cc/WLX6-GDZ3] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020); see also Oscar Couwenberg
& Stephen J. Lubben, The Costs of Chapter 11 in Context: American and Dutch Business
Bankruptcy, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 67–68 (2011).
73 Nicolaes Tollenaar & Thomas Bil, Netherlands, GLOB. RESTRUCTURING REV.
(June 24, 2019), https://globalrestructuringreview.com/review/europe-middle-east-andafrica-restructuring-review/2019/article/netherlands [https://perma.cc/Y999-LX7G].
74 WHOA stands for “Wet Homologatie Onderhands Akkoord.” Below, we follow
the new article numbering in the Dutch Bankruptcy Act and not the one in the proposal for
the WHOA procedure. See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, arts. 369–387.
71
72
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Netherlands sometimes called “The Dutch Scheme” or even the
Dutch “Chapter 11.” The latter procedure has been approved by the
Dutch Parliament and is effective as of the 1st of January 2021.
It is the Dutch Scheme that resembles the United States current
chapter 11 proceedings (and, of course, U.K. schemes), however,
both proposed Acts are aimed at creating a stronger “safe-haven”
for those going into in insolvency proceedings. Our focus in this
paper is on the “Dutch Scheme.” 75
Under the WHOA, or Dutch Scheme, all types of creditors and
shareholders, can be bound. 76 This is in contrast with existing Dutch
reorganization law, which is rarely used because it “only binds
unsecured creditors, making it ineffective against shareholders or
secured or preferential creditors.” 77
The debtor will have the choice of treating the restructuring as a
public or a private process. 78 The public version would trigger
automatic EU cross-border recognition, under the EU insolvency
regulation. However, under the EU insolvency regime the Dutch
Scheme only applies to debtors with their COMI in the
Netherlands. 79 Or the debtor may request a private process, 80 in
which case the Dutch scheme becomes subject to recognition under
any applicable treaties or the domestic private international law of
the countries in which recognition is sought, including national
implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law, such as chapter 15
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The prevailing view, and indeed the view of the Dutch
government, is that the public version of the Dutch Scheme will not
fall within the ambit of the EU regulations on judgments, as it is
expressly construed as an instrument of insolvency law. 81 This is in
75 See N.W.A. Tollenaar, Het Wetsvoorstel Homologatie Onderhands Akkoord
onder de loep genomen [Scrutinizing the Homologation Private Agreement Bill], 32
WETENSCHAP [SCI.] 217, 218 (2019), (providing a critical overview of the WHOA).
76 See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, art. 370.1.
77 Tollenaar & Bil, supra note 73 (discussing the previous failures of Articles 143,
145, and 157 of the previous bankruptcy law in the Netherlands).
78 See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, art. 369.6.
79 See id., art. 369.7; Commission Regulation 2015/848, 2015 O.J. (L 141) arts. 3.1,
3.2 (EC).
80 See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, art. 371.2.
81 See P. M.Veder, Internationale Aspecten Van de WHOA: de Openbare en de
Besloten Akkoordprocedure Buiten Faillissement [International Aspects of the WHOA:
The Public and Private Agreement Procedure Outside Bankruptcy], 6 TIJDSCHRIFT
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contrast to U.K. schemes, which are not characterized as insolvency
proceedings and thus have been argued to fall within the scope of
the judgment regulations. 82 For the private version, the debtor in a
Dutch Scheme has to seek recognition of the procedure under the
law of other jurisdictions, even within the European Union.
That is, the private proceedings—which are heard “in
chambers”—would receive no automatic recognition under the EU
insolvency regulation. 83 These proceedings would appear to be
attractive when there are small numbers of holdouts or nonresponsive creditors to an otherwise consensual deal, or—more
importantly—to international groups of companies with COMI’s or
assets in different jurisdictions. In such cases, the EU insolvency
regulation may cease to be effective. 84 The deal could be announced
upon court approval, thereby minimizing the potential disruption to
the operating business.
The Dutch Scheme engrafts several key chapter 11 provisions
onto its framework, making it far more powerful than the traditional
U.K. scheme of arrangement. 85 For example, plans can be
“crammed down” on dissenting classes, provided that the dissenters
are getting their share—measured by the absolute priority rule— 86
of the reorganization value of the company. 87 The plan must be

FINANCIERING ZEKERHEDEN EN INSOLVENTIERECHTPRAKTIJK [MAG. FUNDING SEC. &
INSOLVENCY L.] 53, 53–54 (2019); Kamerstukken II 2018/2019, 35 249, nr. 3 (Neth.).
82 See Re Metinvest BV [2016] EWHC (Ch) 79, [31] (Eng.).
83 Commission Regulation 2015/848, supra note 79, art. 1 (stating that it is only
applicable to public restructuring regimes).
84 See id. art. 8.1; Veder, supra note 81, at 61; Tollenaar, supra note 75, at 242. If
used to bind actively objecting dissenters, interesting questions of due process might arise
if the proponents sought to obtain recognition in the United States. See 11 U.S.C. § 1506
(“Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by
this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United
States.”).
85 WHOA! New Dutch Scheme Set to Position the Netherlands as a Restructuring
Hub, DLA PIPER (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/
2019/12/global-insight-issue-31/whoa-new-dutch-scheme-set-to-position-thenetherlands-as-a-restructuring-hub/ [https://perma.cc/XW4T-MQZS].
86 That is, liquidation priority. See Harvey R. Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The
Implications of the Third Circuit’s Armstrong Decision on Creative Corporate
Restructuring: Will Strict Construction of the Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11
Consensus Less Likely?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2006).
87 See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, arts. 384.3, 384.4.
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approved by at least one creditor class subject to the plan. 88 A class
accepts the plan if at least two-thirds of the value of the class favors
the plan. 89
The proposed plan can be filed by the debtor at the start of the
case, or the process can be initiated by creditors, shareholders,
employee council or labor unions. 90 If the debtor files the case, as
in chapter 11, there is no court review of the debtor’s eligibility to
file. Where someone other than the debtor files the case, the
petitioning party can ask for the appointment of a restructuring
expert to help conduct the process. 91 The actual in court part of the
process could be as short as three to five weeks.
The law allows for the possibility of a temporary stay of four
months, extendable up to eight months, and the debtors ability to
“prematurely terminate[]” some contracts while keeping valuable
contracts. 92 As summarized by one group of commentators:
Plans under the WHOA are in essence free in form and content.
The intention of the legislator is to minimize the involvement of
the court and leave a large amount of freedom to the parties
involved. Apart from some essential safeguards, the WHOA
provides for a flexible and customizable procedure. Furthermore,
the court has the power to issue tailored rulings during the process
aimed at safeguarding the interests of shareholders and/or
creditors. 93

Notably, the confirmation of a plan is not appealable. 94
In addition to the company itself, creditors can initiate a
reorganization by requesting the court to appoint an expert, who
could offer a composition to creditors and shareholders of the
company. 95

See id. art. 383.1.
Id. art. 381.7.
90 Id. art. 371.1.
91 Id.
92 Id. art. 373.1.
93 WHOA the New Dutch Scheme, ALLEN & OVERY (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/whoa--thenew-dutch-scheme [https://perma.cc/MTB2-PYE3].
94 Id.
95 Id.
88
89
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B. Singapore’s “Supercharged” Scheme of Arrangement
On March 10, 2017, Singapore’s Parliament approved the
Companies (Amendment) Bill 2017 (the “Act”) to enhance the
country’s corporate debt restructuring framework. 96 The Act
focuses on corporate “safe-guarding” and “includes major changes
to schemes of arrangement, judicial management, and cross-border
insolvency.” 97
The Act modified Singapore’s traditional schemes of
arrangement to add many features more commonly associated with
chapter 11. 98 In a rather bold attempt to attract cases that might now
otherwise file in New York or London, the Act provides that “any
corporation liable to be wound up under this Act” may use the
scheme process and expands the scope of the “liable to be wound
up” test to include foreign chartered companies with a “substantial
connection” to Singapore. 99
The Act allows the debtor to seek a stay or moratorium against
creditors even in advance of seeking court approval of a scheme,
and throughout the court process. 100 It is expressly contemplated
that the moratorium might apply extraterritorially, provided the
court has jurisdiction over affected creditors or their assets. 101 Thus,
just as an American chapter 11 court can bind most financial
institutions because of their connections with New York, a court in
Singapore might obtain a similar global reach, at least with regard
the major financial institutions, all of which are apt to have some
96 Corinne Ball et al., Singapore Enacts New Corporate Bankruptcy Law in Bid to
Become Center for International Debt Restructuring, JONES DAY (June 2, 2017),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/singapore-enacts-new-corporate-61737/
[https://perma.cc/KGJ8-52CX].
97 Id. The revised schemes legislation was originally enacted as part of the corporate
law (or the Companies Act) in Singapore. See generally, Companies (Amendment) Act of
2017, supra note 23. On July 30, 2020, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act
2018 (“IRDA”) came into effect. The existing statutory regime for Schemes, as amended
in 2017, has been transplanted into the IRDA, with minor modifications. IRDA §§ 63(3),
246 (Sing.).
98 Singapore Enacts New Corporate Bankruptcy Law to Promote International Debt
Restructuring, JONES DAY (Apr. 2017), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/
2017/04/singapore-enacts-new-corporate-bankruptcy-law-to-promote-international-debtrestructuring [https://perma.cc/L6TA-636X].
99 Previously schemes had been limited to entities incorporated under Singapore law.
IRDA, supra note 97, § 63(3).
100 Re IM Skaugen SE and other matters [2019] 3 SLR 979, [78]–[79] (Eng.).
101 See generally IRDA, supra note 97.
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connection to the island city-state. 102
Courts may now authorize the debtor to incur priority
unsecured, secured, or super-priority secured financing, provided
such financing is deemed necessary to enable the debtor to continue
as a going concern. 103
A “cram-down” provision allows for reorganization over the
objection of a class of dissenting creditors if, among other things,
creditors representing a majority in number and holding at least 75
percent in value of the total claims against the debtor (for which
votes are actually cast) vote in favor of the proposed scheme. 104 In
a direct echo of chapter 11, the court must also find that the scheme
is “fair and equitable” to dissenting creditors and does not
“discriminate unfairly” between two or more classes of creditors. 105
The Act even includes procedures to promote American-style
prepackaged schemes of arrangement. 106 The court may approve a
scheme of arrangement without any meeting of creditors if, among
other things: (i) the debtor-company has provided creditors with a
statement, accompanied by adequate information, explaining the
effects of the scheme; (ii) notice of the application seeking approval
of the scheme is provided to every affected creditor and published;
and (iii) the court is convinced that, if a meeting of creditors were
convened, the scheme would be approved by the required majorities
at the meeting. 107 While American prepacks involve a pre-filing
voting process, this latter requirement seems to contemplate
something a bit less formal.

102 REPUBLIC OF SING. DEP’T OF STAT., MINISTRY OF TRADE & INDUS., YEARBOOK
STATISTICS OF SINGAPORE 218–19 (2019), https://www.singstat.gov.sg/-/media/files/
publications/reference/yearbook_2019/yos2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q3V-MLV8].
103 IRDA, supra note 97, § 67.
104 Id. § 70(3).
105 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). Interestingly, unlike American law, the IRDA does not
provide for a way to extinguish existing and outstanding shares, and thus the absolute
priority rule as codified in the statue provides that:
where the creditors in the dissenting class are unsecured creditors, the terms of
the compromise or arrangement must not provide for any creditor with a claim
that is subordinate to the claim of a creditor in the dissenting class, or any member,
to receive or retain any property of the company on account of the subordinate
claim or the member’s interest.
IRDA, supra note 97, § 70(4)(b)(ii)(B) (emphasis added).
106 IRDA, supra note 97, § 71(1).
107 Id. § 71(3).
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C. English Chapter 11?
Although delayed by other, Brexit-related dramas for several
years, the U.K. government has long shown some awareness that a
substantial gap exists between the traditional scheme of
arrangement, on the one hand, and its other corporate insolvency
mechanisms, on the other. 108 The collapse of several high-profile
debtors reinvigorated the effort to reform the restructuring laws,
albeit only to see the same be swamped by a new round of
governmental distraction.
In short, a few prime ministers ago, the government announced
that it would seek to enact a new “restructuring plan” procedure,
which looks like the old scheme of arrangement process combined
with specific elements of chapter 11. 109 Some had taken to referring
to this new procedure as “chapter 11 lite.”
Then, in response to the economic disruption caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Johnson government quickly pushed
through a series of insolvency reforms. 110 Among these, is a new
Part 26A of the English law Companies Act 2006, now often
referred to as the “Reorganization Plan” provision, which represents
the realization of the earlier “chapter 11 lite” proposal. 111
The Reorganization Plan is a new restructuring tool available to
companies in financial distress that might “affect [] its ability to
carry on trading as a going concern.” 112 There is no insolvency
requirement. An application to court in respect of this new process
108 Irit Mevorach & Adrian Walters, The Characterization of Pre-Insolvency
Proceedings in Private International Law, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 855, 857 (2020) (“This
current vogue for pre-insolvency proceedings is the latest phase of a global effort to fashion
a comprehensive range of debt resolution tools for use at various stages of what
accountants sometimes refer to as the demise curve of the corporate life cycle.”).
109 DEP’T OF BUS., ENERGY, & INDUS. STRATEGY, INSOLVENCY AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 67 (2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/736163/ICG_-_Government_response_doc__24_Aug_clean_version__with_Minister_s_photo_and_signature__AC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7WQ-HQ37].
110 See generally The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill Receives Royal
Assent, GOV.UK (July 1, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/corporateinsolvency-and-governance-bill-receives-royal-assent
[https://perma.cc/DR7T-8JG7]
[hereinafter Corporate Insolvency Bill] (“The bill was only introduced to the House of
Commons on May 20, 2020. This paper focuses only on new Part 26A, as discussed in
the text.”).
111 Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act, supra note 23, sch. 9.
112 Id. § 901A.
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may be made by the company, any creditor or a member of the
company, or by a liquidator or administrator of the company. 113
In broad terms the new Part 26A is like its scheme
predecessor—codified in Part 26—save for certain provisions that
mirror American chapter 11. Most notably, a Reorganization Plan
can be imposed on dissenting classes—this is undeniably a
cramdown provision—unlike traditional schemes, which must be
approved by each class addressed by the plan. 114
The court will have to find that the plan meets two requirements
before the cramdown power can be invoked. First, at least one
impaired class has to approve the plan. 115 This requirement tracks
a similar requirement in American chapter 11 cramdowns,
sometimes referred to as the “somebody has to like it” principle, 116
and also seen in the Dutch Scheme discussed above. In addition,
the court has to find that the plan is better than the “next best
alternative.” 117 The court has broad discretion to determine what
the relevant alternative might be. 118 This requirement has some
similarity to the chapter 11 requirement that dissenting creditors
receive at least as much as they would in a hypothetical chapter 7
liquidation— 119 often called the “best interests of the creditors”
test— 120 but the British version does not limit the comparison to
liquidations.
In schemes of arrangement, and presumably thus also when
considering a Reorganization Plan, the court has absolute discretion
over whether to refuse to sanction a Plan even though the necessary
procedural requirements have been met. 121 This may be, for
example, because a plan is not “just and equitable.” 122
Id. § 901C.
Id. § 901G.
115 Id. §§ 901G(2), (5).
116 Or at least one of the authors refers to it as such. STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, AMERICAN
BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: A PRIMER 148 (2019).
117 Corporate Insolvency Bill, supra note 110, §§ 901G(2), (3).
118 Id. § 901G(4).
119 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
120 LUBBEN, supra note 116, at 148.
121 See Companies Act, supra note 12, § 901F(4)(c) (“Where the court makes an
order under this section . . . the court may by the order impose any requirements . . . which
the court thinks appropriate for facilitating the compromise or arrangement.”).
122 See id. The Explanatory Notes to the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act
2020 suggest that the court has absolute discretion and will draw on the well-established
113
114
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The “next best alternative” aspect of the new Reorganization
Plan potentially opens up the process to the kind of valuation
disputes that American bankruptcy courts routinely handle in
chapter 11. As one commentator notes,
if our extensive experience in such proceedings is anything to go
by, there seems every likelihood that mezzanine and junior
creditors, and other creditors in the capital structure such as
noteholders and bondholders, will seek to deploy aggressive
litigation tactics to leverage their positions. This will all be a new
experience in U.K. restructurings and any company
contemplating a Plan will need to be ready for challenges in court
should it be contemplating this new procedure and seeking to
cram down certain classes of creditors or members. 123

As this article goes to print, Virgin Atlantic Airlines filed the
first Part 26A proceeding in London, 124 and quickly filed for
recognition of the proceeding in the Southern District of New
York. 125
IV. Tools for Restructuring a Global Business
Firms with global operations are likely to run into additional
coordination issues, on top of the normal ones that occur whenever
shareholders and creditors of a firm fight over the residue in a
bankruptcy. A global business has to deal with a multitude of
jurisdictions in which its assets are positioned and the same is true
for creditors of the business, who might be scattered over the planet,
but who can be bound by one or a diverse set of legal
arrangements. 126 Furthermore, the business and its stakeholders
may face a bankruptcy procedure in only one of the jurisdictions or
multiple bankruptcies procedures originating in various
jurisdictions in which the business operates, hindering the
principles that apply in relation to schemes of arrangement. Corporate Insolvency and
Governance Act, supra note 23, Explanatory Notes.
123 Colin Ashford et al., Part 26A Plans, BROWN RUDNICK (June 26, 2020),
https://brownrudnick.com/alert/part-26a-plans/ [https://perma.cc/G564-3VQQ].
124 In re Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. [2020] EWHC (Ch) 2376, [35], [74] (Eng.)
(“[The court] was provided with detailed and persuasive expert evidence from Professor
Stephen J. Lubben. . . .”).
125 In re Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., No. 1:20-BK-11804 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug, 4,
2020).
126 See Irit Mevorach, Modified Universalism as Customary International Law, 96
TEX. L. REV. 1403, 1414 (2018).
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operations of the group as a whole. 127
A global business in financial distress thus faces challenges to
keep its assets together, to prevent individual actions of creditors in
different jurisdictions to lay claim to assets in specific locations and
to coordinate jurisdictions’ proceedings for its global operations.
What is the best way for such a global business to proceed, or if a
choice is available where to start the procedure to maximize the
chance for a successful restructuring? Our focus here is on the
extant law, and not how such law might be improved through
idealized future legislation, agreements, or treaties.
To make such a choice not only the available jurisdictional
options are important, but also what these have to offer the global
business. In previous work we specified two essential elements for
a bankruptcy proceeding: 128 asset stabilization and asset separation.
In that paper we discussed the essential rules a jurisdiction needs to
take up in its bankruptcy laws, but we did not look at global
businesses in distress. In another paper we looked specifically at
global businesses (large and smaller ones) that were using chapter
11 as a way out of financial distress. 129 Here we bundle our two
papers and suggest two essential elements are to be added for global
businesses: 1) worldwide recognition and enforcement, and 2) fair
treatment of creditors. Even in a global setting, a reorganization
option is not essential to the efficiency of a global resolution of
financial distress, although, as we show in our second paper a
reorganization option akin to chapter 11 is of interest to global
businesses.
A. Multiplicity
We use the term “multiplicity” to address the specific situation
in which a business with global operations finds itself: operating in
a multitude of jurisdictions, owning assets in multiple locations in
various legal organizational forms, and having financial
relationships with a diverse and dispersed group of investors.
Multiplicity encompasses the idea of multi-locality, that is the
phenomenon that assets and debts are geographically dispersed, and
that these assets and debts can be governed under a multitude of
127 Stephen J. Lubben & Sarah Pei Woo, Reconceptualizing Lehman, 49 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 297, 318 (2014).
128 See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 22, at 2.
129 See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 3, at 25.
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jurisdictionally specific regulations.
Table 1 below specifies which insolvency or bankruptcy
elements are needed to address the issue of “multiplicity”, in assets,
debts and jurisdictions.
Table 1 The issue of multiplicity
Multi-locality of
assets
Asset

Automatic stay

stabilization

Funding provision

Multi-locality of
equity and debts

Asset

Claim

separation

transformation

Fair treatment

Multi-jurisdictionalism

Distribution rules
Classification rules
Binding creditors
Cram down

World-wide

Recognition

Recognition

Recognition

effect

Enforcement

Enforcement

Enforcement

We proceed by discussing these cells column-wise. So, we start
by addressing assets, then debts and finally jurisdictions.
B. Multi-locality of Assets
A key assumption in any reorganization procedure is that
keeping assets together is better than letting the collection of assets
fall apart. 130 If that is untrue, however, a (bankruptcy) liquidation
proceeding is both sufficient and efficient. Assuming that keeping
assets together is worth something and applying that to global
businesses leads to several observations.
First, as bringing assets together is a board’s business judgment
to create value, it is a similar business judgment to distribute assets
(tangible and intangible) and the build-up of network connections
over various entities and various locations in a global business. 131
This conscious business decision to distribute assets in order to
create value is thus of the same order compared to the decision to
bring specific assets together. Obviously, boards make mistakes,
130 Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 22, at 5 (“Given the conscious decision of the
firm’s management to bring this particular constellation of assets together, negating that
decision upon financial distress would destroy any asset synergies.”).
131 See id. at 5–6.
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but negating that decision at the start of any bankruptcy procedure
implies a liquidation approach.
Second, in a global business, having multiple asset pools that
operate in a networked setting sets it apart from a business operating
in a single jurisdiction. 132 If asset synergies are to be preserved in a
global business, then this should encompass the protection of its
pools of assets and network. Hence, the need for asset stabilization
and the accompanying tools to make this possible: 133 a stay of
creditors to prevent assets being withdrawn from these pools and
disrupting the network. Next, such a stay needs to be accompanied
with a way to free up funds to continue operations, either in the form
of a procedure to award priority to post bankruptcy financing on
existing assets or on future assets of the business. 134
C. Multi-locality of Debts
The issue in managing corporate financial affairs in any firm is
that creditors negotiate for preferential treatment—in and outside
bankruptcy. This can take the form of higher rates or preferential
contractual treatment. Among others, this leads to junior and senior
debt structures and secured and non-secured positions, and myriad
combinations of seniority and security.
A global business can issue debt in a variety of financial centers,
in various coin and under various jurisdictional specific preferential
legal schemes in which (pools of) assets can be contracted as
security. Depending on the strictness of creditor protection laws in
jurisdictions in which the firm is doing business, such security
claims may offer a creditor the right to claim and withdraw assets
from asset pool(s) in case of bankruptcy or non-payment, in the
process destroying the asset synergies. To prevent this from
happening asset stabilization is needed; it keeps the assets together.
However, in order to effectuate a sale of assets, these assets need
to be sold without any claims attached.
This implies a
transformation of a creditor property-like claim into a monetary
tort-like one. 135 Bankruptcy procedures routinely do so: separating
the liabilities from the assets and transform a specific claim on an

132
133
134
135

See id. at 6.
See id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
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asset to a monetary one, equivalent to the value of the asset. 136
Together claim transformation and the ability to offer clean title
to assets, yield the result that assets in one pool can be kept together
or pools of assets can be sold as a bundle, potentially preserving
synergies. In global businesses with financial affairs spanning
financial centers, currencies, and jurisdictions, asset separation is
difficult to achieve. This depends on how jurisdictions co-operate
with respect to recognition of each other rules and enforcement
methods.
D. Multi-jurisdictionalism
With multiple jurisdictions, asset stabilization and asset
separation become problematic as local pools of assets and local
creditors in a specific jurisdiction may act without regard to a global
business’ network synergies and asset pool dependencies. 137 Next,
jurisdictions have obvious differences in contractual rules and
policy preferences in bankruptcy. This multi-jurisdictionalism
leads to additional coordination and creditor treatment issues.
Illustrative in this respect are the cases of Hanjin Shipping and
Swissair.
1. Hanjin Shipping, South Korea
Hanjin Shipping was the largest Korean container transporter
and one of the 10 largest worldwide. 138 It became severely
financially distressed due to long term excess capacity in the global
shipping market. 139 After having tried for months to reach a debt
restructuring with its largest creditors, Hanjin Shipping filed for
receivership in August 2016 with the Korean Bankruptcy Court and
sought court protection in more than 40 countries (including in the
United States with a chapter 15 filing). 140
136 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1978) (defining claim as a “right to an equitable
remedy . . .”).
137 See Irit Mevorach, A Fresh View on the Hard/Soft Law Divide: Implications for
International Insolvency of Enterprise Groups, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 505, 511 (2019).
138 See Costas Paris & In-Soo Nam, Move by South Korea’s Hanjin Shipping Roils
Global Trade, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/troubled-hanjinshipping-to-sell-healthy-assets-to-rival-1472611190 [https://perma.cc/S3RY-DYAV].
139 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2016, at 52–
53, U.N. Sales No. E.16.II.D.7 (2016).
140 See In-Soo Nam, Hanjim Shipping Asks Creditor to Restructure Debt, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 25, 2016) https://www.wsj.com/articles/hanjin-shipping-asks-creditor-to-
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After the bankruptcy declaration became public, creditors all
over the world tried to confiscate assets. 141 Hanjin vessels had
trouble accessing ports as no promise could be given that fees and
services could be paid. 142 Ships, goods and sailors were stuck in
ports or at sea for weeks or even months. 143 Without financial
support to help unlock its assets and goods, Hanjin Shipping’s
operations quickly withered away. 144 The company announced
plans to shut down offices around the world, lay-off workers, sell
assets, and dismantle its service network. 145 In February 2017, the
Korean Bankruptcy Court declared Hanjin Shipping Co. declared
bankrupt, with a court order to liquidate the company. 146
In August 2017, the South Korean bankruptcy trustee reported
that US$ 220 million was collected from the sale of Hanjin’s
assets. 147 In short, 2% of total debt of US$ 10.5 billion Hanjin owed
to its creditors. 148
2. Swissair, Switzerland 149
Swissair, a Swish flag carrier, abruptly ceased flying on 2
restructure-debt-1461582330 [https://perma.cc/LEE2-VB2G]; Joyce Lee & Se Young
Lee, Hanjin Shipping Files for Receivership, as Ports Turn Away Its Vessels, REUTERS
(Aug.
31,
2016)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hanjin-shipping-debtidUSKCN11603N [https://perma.cc/VP9U-FDJQ]; Minjee Kim, Cross-Border Insolvency
and Debt Restructuring Law Reform in Singapore: Reflections on the Hanjin Shipping
Case, 19 AUS. J. ASIAN L. 1–13 (2019).
141 Stephen J. Lubben, Lack of Planning Hampers Hanjin Shipping Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/business/dealbook/lack-ofplanning-hampers-hanjin-shipping-bankruptcy.html
[https://perma.cc/3VFG-LUZ7];
Paris & Nam, supra note 138.
142 Peter Ryan, Hanjin Shipping Collapse in South Korea Leaves Freight Stranded,
Portends Weakening Global Economy, ABC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2016)
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-05/south-korean-shipping-collapse-leaves-freightstranded/7814768?section=business [https://perma.cc/8XCS-CRS3].
143 Stranded Hanjin Crew Denied Shore Leave, MAR. EXEC. (Oct. 5, 2016)
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/stranded-hanjin-crew-denied-shore-leavein-seattle [https://perma.cc/NWJ9-TFBK].
144 See Lee & Lee, supra note 140.
145 Paris & Nam, supra note 138.
146 In-Soo Nam, Hanjin Shipping is Declared Bankrupt, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2017)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hanjin-shipping-is-declared-bankrupt-1487296151
[https://perma.cc/B8XL-X5SM].
147 Paris & Nam, supra note 138.
148 Id.
149 The case of Swissair is taken and slightly adapted from Oscar Couwenberg &
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October 2001. 150 It became financially distressed due to an
aggressive acquisition strategy of smaller airline groups at the end
of the 1990s, incurring large operational losses, a 1998 crash of a
New York to Geneva flight in Nova Scotia, Canada which in turn
resulted in reputational losses, and finally the September 11th 2001
attacks in the United States, causing an already impending liquidity
crisis to spiral out of control. 151 At the specific date in October it
was unable to pay for fuel and landing fees. 152 Tens of thousands of
passengers, crew and planes were stranded worldwide. 153
Swissair’s key figures show its size: it had total assets of € 11.2
billion, € 8.4 billion debts, sales of € 8.1 billion and 68,000
employees. 154
The Swiss federal government decided to intervene and provide
liquidity to Swissair in the form of bridge loans up to 450 million
Swiss francs (€ 281 million). 155 This allowed Swissair to operate
the days after bankruptcy and helped to prevent losing slots and
gates at airports, save jobs, passengers to their destinations, crews
and planes back home and keep Switzerland connected with the
wider world.
In the weeks following the bankruptcy, an asset sale scheme was
devised in which Crossair Ltd Co., the short-haul flight subsidiary

Stephen J. Lubben, Not a Bank, Not a SIFI; Still Too Big to Fail, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEV.
J. 53, 53–80 (2019).
150 Alistair Osborne, Swissair Files for Bankruptcy, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 1, 2001),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2735944/Swissair-files-for-bankruptcy.html
[https://perma.cc/QC8U-AXGD]. Its debt restructuring moratorium was provisionally
approved on October 5, 2001 by the district courts in Zurich and Bülach, Switzerland. See
Legal Status and Powers of the Administrator in the Swissair Group Provisional Debt
Restructuring Moratorium, LIQUIDATOR OF SWISSAIR, https://www.liquidatorswissair.ch/en/proceedings/important-questions.htm [https://perma.cc/S7LJ-A2RZ] (last
visited Aug. 5, 2020).
151 Swissair: Proud Past, Grim Future, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1575798.stm [https://perma.cc/Z53T-MAGT].
152 Id.
153 Thousands Stranded in Airline Crisis, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1577609.stm [https://perma.cc/CKF4-2ZD7].
154 See generally SAIRGROUP, ANNUAL REPORT (1999), http://www.sr692.com/
misc/printed/reports/pdf/SWR1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/84TS-4ATQ]. Swiss francs are
converted at an exchange rate of €/CHF = 0.625. Id. at 9.
155 State Rescues Swissair, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/business/1576636.stm [https://perma.cc/Q9XZ-7FKN].
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of Swissair, took over the bankrupt parent’s operations. 156 Crossair
was funded by the federal government, UBS and Credit Suisse. 157
Crossair was renamed to Swiss International Airlines. 158 In 2005
Swiss International Airlines was taken over by Germany’s
Lufthansa for 340 million Swiss francs (€ 212 million). 159
The similarities between Hanjin Shipping and Swissair are
worth noting. Both firms own expensive specialized assets (ships
and planes), operate a global network of transport lines, are in need
of liquidity to ensure operational continuity (port access and landing
rights, and for both fuel costs), faced adverse market circumstances
(overcapacity) and have their employees travel the globe. When the
firms became severely financially distressed, the outcome differed
dramatically. Swissair was kept alive the first weeks of the
bankruptcy proceedings by a governmental line of credit and then
rescued with the help of banks and a government backed asset sale.
Hanjin Shipping was not offered such help in the early stages of
bankruptcy and was also not able to arrange a debt restructuring, or
an asset sale to save its business. In the end, for Hanjin Shipping a
forced liquidation ensued.
E. Recognition, Enforcement and Fair Treatment
As the Hanjin Shipping case illustrates, value can easily be lost
in a forced unorderly bankruptcy. The Swissair case shows how
governmental involvement can mitigate such losses. However, it is
not to be expected that just any global business in financial distress
can rely on government help, even apart from the question which
government should step up to such a rescue in a truly multinational
business. 160
To prevent the loss of value in the Hanjin Shipping case, the
156 Mark Milner, Syndicate Agrees to Bail Out Swissair, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2001),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2001/oct/23/internetnews.business2
[https://perma.cc/B2MZ-CSNE].
157 Id.
158 Swiss
International Air Lines
Ltd. History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE,
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/swiss-international-air-lines-ltdhistory/ [https://perma.cc/HVC6-79GR] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020).
159 Kevin Done, Lufthansa Pays €217m for Swiss Takeover, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2008), https://www.ft.com/content/e1d4e966-fa89-11dc-aa46-000077b07658 [https://per
ma.cc/63K2-PMDH].
160 In other work we show how bankruptcies of large firms end, among others with
governmental help. See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 149.

382

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

firm needed 1) a worldwide automatic stay and additional liquidity
to free up ships and cargo to preserve value, 2) an ability to monetize
claims and offer clean title to buyers, 3) a formal enforcement
regime to act in various jurisdictions and 4) a form of insolvency
oversight that ensures fair treatment of creditors. Asset stabilization
and separation are not sufficient if these do not extend beyond a
single jurisdiction, these need to extend over multiple
jurisdictions. 161
In that regard, it would already work if a jurisdiction, e.g.,
Singapore, could project its stabilization and separation rules across
borders and that those jurisdictions would recognize these powers
and enforce decisions made by the bankruptcy controlling party. 162
However, this is not sufficient to solve the issue of fair treatment.
As Melissa Jacoby has noted in the domestic context, “[t]he
bankruptcy system’s very premises—not enough to go around,
changing legal entitlements without consent—make its procedures
particularly vulnerable to public distrust.”163 These same basic
concerns are, if anything, more extreme in the global setting.
With multiple jurisdictions involved, each with specific
schemes of contractual security, creditors cannot be sure to be
treated fairly according to their contractual rights, nor when
proceeds have to be shared that their share is fair with respect to
other creditors. 164 The risk of unfair treatment, or outright
expropriation, generates an incentive to hold out, (local) asset runs,
and (lengthy) legal battles in various courts. 165
Fair treatment necessitates that a bankruptcy procedure in order
to have global effect specifies classification rules, distribution rules
and be able to bind creditors either willingly or involuntarily to the
outcome of the distributive part of the bankruptcy procedure. In a
single jurisdiction, this part of the procedure is part and parcel of a
161 See generally Jay L. Westbrook, Global Insolvency Proceedings for a Global
Market: The Universalist System and the Choice of a Central Court, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1473,
1479 (2018).
162 A global insolvency regime might also do this trick, but this seems too much to
ask for the time being. See id. at 1484.
163 Melissa A. Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 1715,
1739 (2018).
164 Cf. Sally McDonald Henry, Chapter 11 Zombies, 50 IND. L. REV. 579, 590 (2017).
165 Edward J. Janger, Reciprocal Comity, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 457 (2011); see Ian
Fletcher, Cross-Border Cooperation in Cases of International Insolvency: Some Recent
Trends Compared, 6 TUL. CIV. L.F. 171, 173 (1991).
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local jurisdiction legal contractual make-up. It is part of the reason
why foreign companies find chapter 11 or the English scheme of
arrangement attractive: it specifies such rules and is able to bind
creditors in other jurisdictions. 166 However, that might not happen
in an insolvency of a global business as multiple classification and
distribution schemes can be applicable. And these may very well
conflict one another. 167
This leads to the follow-on observation that to secure such a fair
treatment, the procedure needs to offer creditors an impartial
supervisor—a trustee, judge, monitor, or creditors’ committee—to
oversee debtor and creditor behavior, and to coordinate and steer
legal actions in the various jurisdictions to secure fair treatment.
This especially relates to asset separation as selling assets, releasing
assets or leaving them to creditors needs a supervisor to secure
outcomes that benefit all.
Having such rules to ensure fair treatment is then only a small
step towards reorganization as the distributive rules may allow for
a hypothetical sale to current claim owners. However, this is not
essential for efficiency as asset synergies and network might be sold
together to a bidder, even if finding such a bidder takes time. 168
F. Procedural Contenders for Global Businesses in Distress
Table 2 below gives an overview of procedural contenders for
global businesses in distress, specifying their main regulatory tools.

See Westbrook, supra note 161, at 1480–81.
For example, a conflict may ensue with the U.K. scheme of arrangement
concerning the Gibbs rule. See Kannan Ramesh, The Gibbs Principle, 29 SING. ACAD. L.J.,
42, 74 (2017).
168 See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 22.
166
167
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Table 2 Dealing with multiplicity in proceedings
U.K.
Part
26A
No

Ch. 15+
U.K.
Part 26A

Sing.
Scheme

Ch. 15+
Sing.
Scheme

Dutch
Scheme

Ch. 15+
Dutch
Scheme

169

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No 170

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ch. 11
Stay
Priority
funding
Trustee
Clean title
Distribution rules
Classification rules
Binding
creditors
Cram
down

Yes

The first thing to note is that many of the procedures either
alone, or in combination with chapter 15, offer the same basic set of
tools that chapter 11 provides. For example, Singapore’s scheme
offers essentially everything that chapter 11 does, and when
combined with a chapter 15, it becomes binding in both Singapore
and U.S. courts. It is easy to imagine that covering many business’
creditors in full.
The United Kingdom’s ongoing role in Europe is, of course,
uncertain. But if London remains a global financial center, it may
offer a wide jurisdictional reach for its new Part 26A, especially
when combined with New York and chapter 15. If Amsterdam’s
role as a financial center grows post-Brexit, the new Dutch Scheme
would seem to provide an obvious replacement for the U.K. process.
Singapore offers a similar package focused on the Pacific.
Furthermore, the Singaporean and Dutch contenders offer a
regulatory oversight element that chapter 11, chapter 15 and U.K.
Part 26A lack. If such oversight would indeed prove to be
instrumental in preventing or mitigating strategic expropriative
169 The United Kingdom has adopted a moratorium law, but it has little import for the
larger businesses that we examine in this paper. See Corporate Insolvency and Governance
Act, supra note 23, § A2.
170 A court appointed restructuring expert can be appointed on request of the
petitioning party. See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, art. 42A.
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behavior it adds to the ex ante attractiveness of these two schemes.
The “Gibbs rule” would seem to present a problem for both the
Dutch and Singapore systems if bond debt continues to favor
English law after Brexit. But the problem would seem to apply only
to those creditors who are subject to jurisdiction in neither the
location of the proceeding or the United States. For example, if a
recalcitrant creditor did pursue action on English law debt in the
English courts, and such action would be contrary to a worldwide
moratorium imposed by a Singapore court, then, if the creditor is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court, such a creditor
would face the sanction of the Singapore court.
But the problem is also easily avoided by using (or changing
over to) New York law in place of English law in the debt
instruments, and then enforcing the Singapore proceeding through
U.S. chapter 15, even if the creditor is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Singapore. Moreover, unless the debtor actually had
significant assets in the United Kingdom, the prospect of a “rogue”
judgment in the jurisdiction, simply based on a choice of law clause,
would present little problem for the overall reorganization.
The table also makes clear why the traditional U.K. scheme,
even when paired with a chapter 15 filing, might soon fade as a key
tool in restructuring global businesses. The scheme plus chapter 15
approach offers greater flexibility than an old-fashioned chapter 11
case. 171 But a scheme itself offers a less robust restructuring tool
than chapter 11, and once the United Kingdom is no longer part of
the European Union, its attraction to European businesses might
quickly fade in the face of other options.
On the other hand, the United Kingdom’s proposed Part 26A
might have some real advantages given the lead that the United
Kingdom already has with traditional schemes. Any move away
from schemes is not apt to benefit chapter 11 itself, but rather the
combined package of “enhanced scheme” plus chapter 15 looks
more likely to come out on top. Enhanced scheme reorganization
systems—like the Dutch, Singapore, and new U.K. systems—
benefit from offering the powerful features of chapter 11, without
the necessarily embracing litigation-centric approach to
restructuring seen in chapter 11.

171

In re Avanti Commc’ns Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603, 606 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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G. And an Argument for Chapter 11 Versatility
Although the arguments above imply that chapter 11 will lose
“market share” to these contenders, its versatility is often
underestimated. We see two additional arguments that may give
chapter 11 an edge over the others as the tool of choice for
restructuring global businesses. First, at present, most chapter 15
petitions are presented to the courts in Delaware and New York
without opposition. Indeed, the vast bulk of the creditors are likely
contractually precluded from objecting under the terms of the
lockup agreement they signed in connection with the scheme that
undergirds the chapter 15 petition. It is not clear that these
agreements actually preclude making arguments in American
courts, but given that the contracts are enforceable under non-U.S.
law, in foreign courts, no creditor has yet been willing to take that
chance. 172
Moreover, true dissenters are presently able to sell their
positions in relatively deep and liquid distressed debt markets. 173
But if market conditions were to change—and liquidity in debt
markets plainly cannot be taken for granted— 174 these dissenters
might find their path to exit closed. As a result, they might take a
more active (and contentious) role in both scheme and chapter 15
hearings. It also remains to be seen how U.S. bankruptcy courts
will react to American debtor-firms using foreign procedures to
reorganize their own capital structures. An unfavorable ruling on a
chapter 15 petition, wherein an American company seeks
recognition for its restructuring under Singapore law, for example,
could have profound effects on the present global reorganization
structure.
Thus, market conditions or abuse might lead to the development
of unfavorable chapter 15 caselaw. Without the ability to make
172 See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Private Benefits Without Control?
Modern Chapter 11 and the Market for Corporate Control, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 145, 164 (2018).
173 Katherine Doherty & Allison McNeely, Distressed Debt Traders Have Tons of
Cash and Nothing to Buy, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-07-19/distressed-debt-traders-have-tons-of-cash-and-nothing-to-buy
[https://perma.cc/VJ6W-SPEZ].
174 Andrew Osterland, Investors Worry Liquidity Crisis Looms on Fixed Income
Horizon, CNBC (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/03/investors-worryliquidity-crisis-might-loom-on-fixed-income-horizon.html
[https://perma.cc/Z5U3HMMS].
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foreign “pre-insolvency” procedures binding in the United States,
the (near) worldwide reach of chapter 11 might overcome the
current perception that chapter 11 is too complex and expensive.
Second, if future global debtors are more deeply distressed, they
might also benefit from the use of chapter 11. At present most
global debtors are able to reorganize their capital structures alone,
since they key problem is simply over-indebtedness. But extreme
liquidity in debt market, combined with the “cov light”
phenomenon, 175 might mean that the next round of global debtors
in distress are in need of something more, namely an operational
and financial restructuring. That is, they might reach the point of
restructuring either later in the cycle of distress, or only when the
distress is otherwise quite severe. This too might make chapter 11
more attractive than any of the “stripped down” procedures we have
examined in this paper.
Indeed, chapter 11 is the only
reorganization system presently on offer that could provide a full
organizational restructuring of a global debtor.
V. Conclusion
Global debtors are seemingly on the verge of a wealth of choices
with regard to their restructuring. While in the past the United
States and the United Kingdom have dominated in this area, the
combined effects of Brexit and the increasing ability to get the best
features of chapter 11 without needing to embrace all of chapter 11
itself, mean that both jurisdictions are apt to lose some of this
business going forward. If that so happens, the United States may
then maintain a subsidiary role in global restructuring through
chapter 15, and the bankruptcy court’s broad willingness to
recognize foreign proceedings thereunder. The United Kingdom’s
future role is largely dependent on market acceptance of the new
Part 26A Reorganization Plan process, and its continued role in the
global financial system post-Brexit. On the other hand, chapter 11
may still continue its dominating worldwide role in case global
firms in distress need its operational and financial restructuring
versatility that the others cannot not (yet) provide.

175 Christian Pilkington & Ian Wallace, Restructuring the Next Wave of Cov-lite Debt,
WHITE & CASE (July 11, 2019), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/
restructuring-next-wave-cov-lite-debt [https://perma.cc/Q5XH-CE34].
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